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A commentary on
Getting ahead: forward models and their
place in cognitive architecture.
by Pickering, M., and Clark, A. (2014).
Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 451–456. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2014.05.006
Pickering and Clark (2014) present two
ways of viewing the role of forward models
in human cognition: the auxiliary for-
ward model (AFM) account and the inte-
gral forward model (IFM) account. The
AFM account “assumes a dedicated pre-
diction mechanism implemented by addi-
tional circuitry distinct from the core
mechanisms of perception and action” (p.
451). The standard AFM account exploits
a corollary discharge from the motor com-
mand in order to compute the sensory
consequences of the action. In contrast,
on the IFM account, “perception itself
involves the use of a forward (genera-
tive) model, whose role is to construct
the incoming sensory signal ‘from the top
down”’ (p. 453). Furthermore, within this
account, motor commands are dispensed
with: they are predictions that are fulfilled
by movement as part of the prediction
error minimization that is taken to gov-
ern all aspects of cognition (Adams et al.,
2013).
Pickering and Clark present two “test-
ing grounds” for helping us adjudicate
between IFMs and AFMs, which are
committed to the idea, derived from
Pickering’s own work, that one predicts
others in a way that is similar to the way
that one predicts oneself. Although I like
this “prediction by simulation” account, in
this commentary, I want to emphasize that
neither the IFM nor the AFM accounts are
necessarily wedded to it.
A less committal, and hence perhaps
more compelling, testing ground is to be
found in psychotic symptoms, and the
capacity of the two frameworks to account
for them. Indeed, using psychosis to illus-
trate forward modelling is not new: the
inability to self-tickle was taken to be
convincing data for the presence of for-
wardmodels (viewed, by default, within an
AFM account), and in particular for prob-
lems with them in patients with diagnoses
of schizophrenia (Frith et al., 2000).
The AFM account has been used
more generally to explain symptoms of
schizophrenia. Something goes wrong
with the generation of the forward model,
and so the sensory consequences of self-
generated stimuli are poorly predicted,
and hence fail to be attenuated, and are,
ultimately, misattributed to an external
source. Although most have accepted this
for delusions of control, some have ques-
tioned the application of this model to
passive symptoms (Stephens and Graham,
2000), namely those which do not involve
action, such as auditory verbal hallu-
cinations (AVHs). If the symptoms of
schizophrenia are explainable in terms of
problems with an AFM, and this is con-
structed out of a motor command, then
non-motoric (“passive”) symptoms can-
not be so explained.
One move has been to keep working
within the AFM framework but claim that
“passive” symptoms merely look passive:
they are actually “active.” Several theorists
(e.g., Jones and Fernyhough, 2007) have
attempted to explain AVHs in terms of
inner speech misattribution, where inner
speech is taken to involve motoric ele-
ments. This motoric involvement has been
empirically supported by several elec-
tromyographical (EMG) studies (which
measured muscular activity during inner
speech) some of which date as far back
as the early 1930s (Jacobsen, 1931). Later
experimentsmade the connection between
inner speech and AVH, showing that sim-
ilar muscular activation is involved in
healthy inner speech and AVH (Gould,
1948). The involvement of motoric ele-
ments in both inner speech and in AVH
is further supported by findings (Gould,
1950) showing that when subjects hallu-
cinated, subvocalizations occurred which
could be picked up with a throat micro-
phone. That these subvocalizations were
causally responsible for the inner speech
allegedly implicated in AVHs, and not
just echoing it, was suggested by data
(Bick and Kinsbourne, 1987) demonstrat-
ing that if people experiencing hallucina-
tions opened their mouths wide, stopping
vocalizations, then the majority of AVHs
stopped.
However, this does not seem to capture
all AVH subtypes. For example, Dodgson
and Gordon (2009) convincingly present
“hypervigilance hallucinations,” which
are not based on self-generated stimuli,
but constitute hypervigilant boosting and
molding of external stimuli. As I have
argued (Wilkinson, 2014) recently, one
can account for both inner speech-based
and hypervigilance hallucinations, within
an IFM framework (although I called it
a “Predictive Processing Framework”).
Since it is good practice to support mod-
els that accommodate more phenomena,
assuming (as seems plausible) that hyper-
vigilance hallucinations are a genuine
subtype of AVH, the IFM account is
preferable to the AFM account.
In conclusion, although I agree with
Pickering and Clark that the IFM account
is preferable, I do so on the basis of a
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somewhat different “testing ground.” The
IFM can account for both active and pas-
sive psychotic symptoms. The AFM, in
tying itself to motor commands, can only
explain the former.
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